6

Maximilian Chaoulideer

Losing and Regaining the Self through
Language:
Individuation in Nietzsche’s Creative Use
of Metaphor
Maximilian Chaoulideer

T

hroughout his writings, Nietzsche criticizes language
for what he takes to be its distortions of thought.i The
social nature of language, he claims, generalizes that
which, in experience, is particular and thereby flattens
our individual thoughts to communicable expressions. This is
part of Nietzsche’s general critique of socialized man; he sees the
individual as being compromised by the assimilating power of
social norms, including those of language. He puts this somewhat differently in his powerful essay “On Truth and Lies in a
Nonmoral Sense,” in which he tells a story of the social origins of
language and of the arbitrary conceptual framework produced
by it. In particular, the concept of “truth:” it is one of the most
powerful social fictions, according to Nietzsche, and is a paradigmatic case of the distortion of the particular as something generally conceivable. This account elaborates on his notion of language as productive of the illusion of conceptual generalities and
therefore an aberration of our experience of the fundamentally
non-conceptual world. that language is derivative of thought and
fails to accurately capture it in its attempt to communicate it. The
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notion of truth, of communicated experience, and that of the concept at all, are all subject to criticism by Nietzsche because they
are share in the fundamental problem with language: it attempt
to convey a world of particulars through communicable generalities.
Nietzsche does, however, go beyond the traditional philosophical deprecation of language as the impoverished expression
of thought by suggesting that one can preserve the depth of individuality—of asocial thought and feeling—through language by
using the conceptual framework for one’s own creativity and self
-discovery. The exemplary instantiation of this use of language is
the writing of Nietzsche himself. Behind these criticisms directed
towards language there is the suggestion that one can move beyond these problems, that one even needs the usually limiting
linguistic framework to “play with”—to twist and break its conventions—to be (re)creative of one’s individuality (and thoughtii). Thus while it may seem to be a contradiction to both criticize
language for its generalization and de-individuation and herald
a particular use of language as enriching and creative of the individual, we will see that the latter analysis of language is predicated on the fact contained in the former. It is because language can
only convey a thin version of thought that it can be used to stimulate—even demand—individuation. This will become clearer
when we look at the relation between Nietzsche’s texts and his
reader.
Before trying to explicate the complex manner in which language can be thought of as useful or even necessary to selfdiscovery as conveyed in the final section of “On Truth and Lies
in a Nonmoral Sense,” his critique of language as detrimental to
our individuality and productive of countless distortions and
falsehoods which masquerade as truths must first be understood.
Besides “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” there are at
least two texts which treat the dissimulation of language explicitly. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche seeks to uncover the development both of consciousness and of language, finding the origins
of both in “the need to communicate,” and seeing them both as
productive of the same diseases of the individual—or rather, that
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all that is problematic in consciousness is made manifest in language: “the thinking which becomes conscious is only the smallest part of it, let’s say the shallowest, worst part - for only that
conscious thinking takes place in words, that is, in communication symbols.”iii The following passage from this aphorism describe the inherent problem with conscious thought, which is
language makes manifest:
each of us, even with the best will in the world to
understand ourselves as individually as possible,
‘to know ourselves’, will always bring to consciousness precisely that in ourselves which is
‘non-individual’, that which is ‘average’; that due
to the nature of consciousness - to the ‘genius of
the species’ governing it - our thoughts themselves are continually as it were outvoted and
translated back into the herd perspective. At bottom, all our actions, are incomparably and utterly
personal, unique, and boundlessly individual,
there is no doubt; but as soon as we translate them
in consciousness, they no longer seem to be [...]
everything which enters consciousness thereby
becomes shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, a
sign, a herd-mark; that all becoming conscious
involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization.iv
This translation of our individual thoughts into the conscious
and communicable realm of society has wide repercussions: Nietzsche attributes the loss of our individuality to the introduction
of the conscious and the linguistic, a loss which is marked by the
replacement of the particular with the universal, the deep with
the shallow, the true with the false, and so on.
In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche presents another negative picture of language, namely “Language as Putative Science”v
in an aphorism thus named. This aphorism examines language
not through its relationship to consciousness and our socialization, but rather as a manmade tool that falsely claims to describe
the world truthfully (hence “putative science”). Again, Nietzsche
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tells a brief story of the development of language and how that
has lead to error:
The sculptor of language was not so modest as to
believe that he was only giving things designations, he conceived rather that with words he was
expressing supreme knowledge of things [...] A
great deal later - only now - it dawns on men that
in their belief in language they have propagated a
tremendous error.vi
This aphorism suggests that this error lies in man’s notion that
his grasp of the world is sufficient to be able to construct a parallel world (in language) that could “make itself master” over the
world it describes—that is, that the linguistic world could somehow grasp and even inform our experience of the world. The
sketch of this thought found in Human, All Too Human, is derived from his earlier essay, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral
Sense,” in which this criticism of language is expanded but also
greatly complicated.
In contrast to these two relatively straightforward aphorisms,
both of which present language simply as a propagator of error,
“On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” paints a more nuanced
and compelling picture of language and its relation to our
thought. Nietzsche again uses a genealogy to frame his analysis.
The essay focuses on the emergence and dominance of the concept “truth,” providing a theory of language that helps to bridge
the two different criticisms presented above.
“The ‘thing in itself’,” Nietzsche tells us, is “something quite
incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not
in the least worth striving for. This creator only designates the
relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he
lays hold of the boldest metaphors.”vii These metaphors, he continues, are twice removed from what they attempt to describe:
words are “imitations” of images, which are themselves
“imitations of nerve stimuli.” Each of these metaphorical translations maps the original stimulus onto an entirely different sphere
incapable of preserving the content of the former. That is, just as
a smell can never be captured by sound, no matter how complex,
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nerve stimuli are simply not reproducible as images or as
sounds, and any translation into these latter forms is therefore a
severe distortion of the former. This idea of something being lost
in translation into language is prominent in the aphorism in The
Gay Science mentioned above as well; there is something about
language that renders it incompatible with our thought, our experience of particulars.
Nietzsche pins this incompatibility on language’s fundamentally conceptual nature: any translation into language is a translation into concepts. The distortion in this translation then stems
from the imposition of generalities, or concepts, onto actualities,
which are particular: Nietzsche posits that “we obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and
actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts, and likewise with no species, but only with an X which
remains inaccessible and undefinable for us.”viii Language forces
dissimilar things into one conceptual unit, he claims, not only
producing the illusion that they are similar, but that they share
some underlying essence which makes them what they are; concepts bring with them false essences which lead us to draw the
conclusion that, for example, those things we call true are true
because of some truthfulness, some essential quality that makes
them true. This entirely disguises the fact that its truth is merely
the product of its being linguistically designated as such. This
illusion behind the concept of truth applies to everything conceived linguistically.
What does this discussion of fictitious universals and linguistic concepts have to do with the criticism leveled in The Gay Science; what import does this have on man’s individuality? This
question is answered by the second section of “On Truth and
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” in which Nietzsche sets up the contrast between what he calls the “rational man” and the “intuitive
man.”
This “rational” man is the one who is the subject of On the
‘genius of the species’, the passage from The Gay Science we
looked at earlier; he is the one who suffers from a lack of individuality at the hands of his linguistic socialization. The entire edi-
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fice of metaphor in which he lives and thinks is one of
“averages,” one of generalizations. He expresses himself through
the language of society (for there is no other kind of language
available to him), and thereby loses sight of his individuality, his
uniqueness. It is the same loss described in the case of truth, or of
any concept: all of these linguistic abstractions of universals from
particulars constitute the abstraction of the social from the individual: man’s sociality is his being bounded by society’s linguistic conventions. It is here that one begins to see where Nietzsche
might see a way out; that though, generally, language is a medium inclined towards the social, it is its restrictiveness in particular, its complete obedience to convention, which is problematic.
Beyond making the core of his critique of language clear, this
essay also acknowledges language to now be inseparable from
man. He rightly rejects the possibility of reverting to a nonlinguistic, asocial state by flatly stating that “the drive toward the
formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive, which
one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought, for one
would thereby dispense with man himself.”ix Nietzsche therefore
works to conceive of a way to undo the loss of the individual
without discarding language altogether. This is what makes the
essay so interesting: not only does Nietzsche beautifully articulate the obstacles inherent to linguistic expression, he also recognizes man’s attachment to language and suggests a way to remain faithful to oneself through ‘individual creativity’ (this rather vague phrase will hopefully become clearer later) while remaining a linguistic animal.
Nietzsche’s suggestion is as follows: out of the conceptual
bonds which tie rational man to convention and his sociality, another man (the “intuitive” one) is able to become “creative” by
bending and breaking those norms of metaphor. This very nietzschean notion of rediscovering—or perhaps simply discovering—oneself by finding a creative mode within or out of the stifling framework responsible for that initial loss of individuality
is beautifully (though admittedly obscurely) related through his
description of the intuitive man, the “free intellect”:

12

Maximilian Chaoulideer

that immense framework and planking of concepts to which the needy man clings his whole life
long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a
scaffolding and toy for the most audacious feats of
the liberated intellect. And when it smashes this
framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and
puts it back together in an ironic fashion, pairing
the most alien things and separating the closest, it
is demonstrating that it has no need of these
makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be
guided by intuitions rather than by concepts.
There is no regular path which leads from these
intuitions into the land of ghostly schemata, the
land of abstractions. There exists no word for
these intuitions; when man sees them he grows
dumb, or else he speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts. He does this so that by shattering and
mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at
least correspond creatively to the impression of
the powerful present intuition.x
The intuitive man frees himself by shedding his conceptual
bonds, by de- and reconstructing the metaphorical framework,
by “playing with seriousness.” But what would it look like to be
creative in this way, to be playful in the manner just described? I
would suggest that the best guides to understanding this intuitive man are Nietzsche’s writings themselves.
As any reader can attest, Nietzsche is conspicuously convoluted:xi he purposefully makes himself difficult to understand
and paraphrase. He writes in metaphor and in parable—his
prose rarely lends itself to any immediate understanding, what
we might call poetic prose. We should see this as necessary for
Nietzsche for two complimentary reasons. The first has to do
with the production of writing itself: he avoids the dangers of
language sketched out above for himself. That is, he manages to
preserve himself in his writing. The second regards its reception:
his style is meant to produce a philosophical language that will
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have the pedagogical effect on his readers he extolls in so much
of his writings. First let us think about the manner in which Nietzsche’s writing style is exemplary of the productions of an intuitive man.
The intuitive man “speaks only in forbidden metaphors and
in unheard-of combinations of concepts,” he tells us. One cannot
help but be reminded of Zarathustra’s bizarre speeches, the
countless metaphors used in foreign contexts—what one might
call a linguistic playfulness. His unconventional use of metaphor
and conjunctions of otherwise entirely disjointed things is a perfect demonstration of a certain freedom from the conceptual
boundaries language generally imposes upon us. There is still
the question of why it would be that creativity or originality in
writing should be thought of as personal or individual, why one
should think that unconventional—and in that sense creative—
usage of language constitutes an expression of individuality. If
we take Nietzsche’s texts, particularly Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
to be paradigmatic of the intuitive man, the answer to this seems
clear.
The rational man is he who speaks and writes (and therefore
thinks) using a framework he has adopted, taken from others. He
is rooted to society’s perspective, not his own, and is therefore
merely regurgitating that which has been given to him. This is
the rational aim: to remove the differences that arise from perspectives and attain some universal truth or view that is meant to
be compatible with anyone. But in truth it is compatible with no
one: though every individual speaks in the same manner and is
consistent in their language, they are not doing this qua individual, but rather qua member of society. It is this man to whom
Nietzsche stands in such stark contrast. If we understand the poetic quality of Nietzsche’s writing to be symptomatic of his dedication to writing as an individual rather than his being obscure
for the end of not being understood by the common or some other such motivation, it becomes clear in what manner he stands so
opposed.
The intuitive man uses a form that must be foreign to others,
it must appear strange and unapproachable; for the language to
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be Nietzsche’s own, it cannot be entirely ours as well. Hence,
such convolution is the product (though of course not always
indicative) of successfully individuated writing, writing which is
free from the rigid framework that would socialize it and render
it easily accessible to all readers. Thus, the intuitive man is
marked by his creative (re)individuation. He is able to preserve
the individual in a medium that is initially and primarily averaging and social.
We see in “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” that
Nietzsche does much more than present two (perhaps even conflicting) analyses of language—one distorting, the other enriching. Rather, the intuitive man’s creative use of language is made
possible by the degraded nature of the medium. This is clearer in
the creativity required on the part of the reader than on the part
of the writer. Beginning in his early essay Schopenhauer as Educator and continuing through Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche impresses over and over that the culmination of education
lies in the overcoming of the educator, in taking that which one
has learned from the educator and making it one’s own, and in
this sense rejecting the teacher and their teachings. At the end of
the first part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra directs his
disciples to do precisely this:
go away from me and resist Zarathustra! And
even better: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he deceived you. [...] You had not yet sought yourselves: and you found me. Thus do all believers;
therefore all faith amounts to so little. Now I bid
you lose me and find yourselves; and only when
you have all denied me will I return to you.xii
This sentiment courses throughout the book and, as I
said, its earliest expression can already be found in Schopenhauer as Educator.xiii
I suggest that we take Zarathustra’s relation to his disciples
to be analogous to the relation Nietzsche would like his readers
to have to his texts. Zarathustra is a successful educator because
of his poetic use of language. He does not speak or act in a way
which can be straightforwardly adopted: both for the obvious
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reason that nothing he says is clear or consistent enough to be
treated as direct prescriptive doctrine and because—as illustrated above—he makes explicit the kind of education he wants to
foster. His disciples have to form their own individuated response to the example set Zarathustra before they can be said to
be followers of him at all. Similarly, Nietzsche’s style is meant to
force an engagement with the text which requires the reader to
read into it, to further determine his meaning; the text’s resistance to being immediately and passively taken on requires
that the reader interpret the text and thereby make it their own.
Both Nietzsche and Zarathustra avoid systematic doctrine and
instead use poetic language to convey their thoughts; not to perfectly preserve their individuality in their language, but to
prompt the interpreter to impose their own individuality onto
the language.
If we return to the notion in the Gay Science which holds that
linguistic expression is the “flattening” of thought and that this is
a problem that becomes salient in the context of communication,
we might think of our experience of actuality, of our individuated thoughts, as a deep well which is dried up when expressed in
language. The task is therefore to produce language which demands refilling, re-enrichment. Or, put differently, language
which prompts the reader to reread, reflect, reject, question—to
think for themselves—is, though itself impoverished, productive
of a richness perhaps equal to the original thought behind the
language. To read in this way is to make language one’s own, to
take that dried up, derivative reminiscence of—in this case Nietzsche’s—perspective, and give it depth again, restore its individuality. This restoration will have the effect of restoring perspective of a new kind, since it is now the reader’s thought, not Nietzsche’s. This is precisely why it is an inherently impoverished
medium that is needed to produce the kind of demand on the
reader or interlocutor stimulated by both Nietzsche and Zarathustra.
Presenting the reader with texts that require this reenrichment of thought should then be thought of as teaching that
reader to seek re-individuation through language. It is in this
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sense that Nietzsche’s unusual metaphors, his bizarre and unconventional use of parable and quotation, even his use of punctuation, all function as ways of jarring the reader and thereby
forcing them to interpret, drawing them out of their rationalist
passivity and compelling them to intuitively contribute their
own personal richness to that language. This is the pedagogical
power of the intuitive man.
We see then, that Nietzsche’s sharp denigrations of language
and its place in obscuring individuality as well as his abstruse
prose are in the service of arousing our ability and desire to
move beyond conventional linguistic expression as well as produce philosophical engagement arising from their individuality,
not their appropriation of socially prepared concepts. As with so
much of Nietzsche’s ostensibly negatively charged analysis of
society, it is motivated entirely by the positive aim of discovering
and extolling that which is unique to each of us, to shed the social in favor of the individual and spark that discovery in his
reader.
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vi.
vii.

viii.
ix.
x.
xi.

xii.

“Thought” is meant here to get at the individual’s rich
experience of the world. A non-linguistic and uncommunicated sensation, feeling, or whatever else we
might think of in an immediate encounter with the
world. This may well mean that such a “thought” is not a
conscious one, that it is, so to speak, not even communicated to ourselves. Though there are interesting and difficult questions to be pursued here, this paper attempts
solely to flesh out Nietzsche’s positions on language and
will leave the precise nature of “thought” largely untreated.
I will be using “the individual” more or less interchangeably with personal “thought,” an equation the reasons
for which should become clear.
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xiii.
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See Schopenhauer as Educator, §§1 and 7, for example.
His idea of the exemplar—a figure to surpass, not to
merely emulate—is comparable to the role of Zarathustra
here.
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